The Thread

deneb

Well-Known Member
RBI is right, critics be damned
The Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI), Mid-Quarter Monetary Policy Review communiqu of June 18, 2012, cogently sets out the reasons for not easing monetary policy. The growth-inflation dynamics point to several factors being responsible for the economic slowdown, and easing monetary policy would merely exacerbate inflationary pressures.

The Finance Minister, on June 16, 2012, said that “he was confident that the RBI would adjust the monetary policy”.

On June 17, 2012, Finance Ministry officials counselled public sector banks to bring down interest rates, if RBI cuts policy interest rates. India Inc. had been storming the citadels of monetary towers clamouring for easing of monetary policy to stimulate investments.

The RBI was faced with slowing growth, inflation, on a-year-on-year basis at 7.6 per cent on the Wholesale Price Index (WPI) and 10.4 per cent on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) —outside the RBI’s comfort zone — a weak global environment, a fisc out of control and a depreciating rupee.

The wedge between deposit growth and credit expansion also ruled out any easing of monetary policy. The predictable response was that India Inc. was “angry”.
GOVERNOR HITS BACK

In an unusually hard-hitting speech, at the Indian Merchants’ Chamber on June 19, 2012, Governor Dr D. Subbarao stressed that there was nothing inevitable about the India growth story and that achieving growth was a shared responsibility of the government, the RBI and economy managers. He emphasised that the blame game cannot go on; it was not good for anyone, particularly the majority of the population. The poor are vulnerable to inflation as it is a regressive tax which hurts the poor the most; their voice, silent as it is, must be heard.

Governor Subbarao comes out fighting from his corner, and this speech will go down in the annals of RBI history as one of the most powerful and frank speeches by an RBI Governor.

The matter will not end here, and the RBI should be ready for a battle of attrition. The RBI can take solace in the fact that it is doing the right thing, if it comes in for bitter attack; and conversely, doing the wrong thing, if praise is heaped on it.

Economists, analysts and India Inc. will continue to attack the RBI for its 2012 monetary policy for the next twenty years!
BLAST FROM THE PAST

A case in point is the monetary policy period of 1994-96 which, even today, is subject to strong criticism. It is fortunate that the RBI Annual Reports for June 1995 and June 1996 provide copious information on what happened and what the RBI did.

From the latter part of 1993-94, there were heavy capital inflows. The RBI, in its endeavour to prevent inflation and an appreciating rupee, intervened in the forex market to buy up foreign currency and to avoid the adverse impact of monetary expansion it undertook large open market sales of dated securities.

As the RBI’s stock of government securities dwindled, from June 1994 onwards, there was a phased increase in the CRR on overall liabilities and such non-resident liabilities as were exempt for the CRR were brought under the CRR.

In February-April 1995, the maximum deposit rate was raised in stages from 10 per cent to 12 per cent and export refinance facilities were curtailed.

With double digit inflation, reduction in inflation became a priority for policy action. The point-to-point WPI inflation, which was 10.4 per cent in 1994-95, was brought down in 1995-96 to 5.0 per cent.

At that time, there was no composite CPI index, but industrial workers’ CPI came down marginally from 9.7 per cent in 1994-95 to 8.9 per cent in 1995-96.

The persistent criticism of the 1994-96 monetary policy, even today, is that monetary policy was too tight in 1995-96. This is a total canard. While in 1995-96 there were sales of forex by the RBI, there was a substantially larger release of the CRR. This is conclusively brought out in the RBI Annual Report for 1995-96 (Page 3).

There was a very short period when liquidity was tightened around November 1995, as banks were borrowing heavily in the call money market and using the money to buy forex in the market.

To prevent this from happening, the RBI temporarily shut off support to the money market. The call money rate zoomed to stratospheric levels but once the pressure on the forex market eased the RBI quickly restored support to the call money market.

Critics of the RBI policies of 1994-96 fail to recognise that the GDP slowdown occurred two years later; the economy was growing beyond its potential and a slowdown was inevitable.

An impartial analysis by Rajiv Malik many years ago conclusively showed that the RBI policies of 1994-96 had nothing to do with the slowdown of growth in the subsequent two years.

Dastardly attacks on the monetary policy of 1994-96, which even continue to date, are a reflection of economists resorting to political nonsense to gain a few brownie points.

The RBI Annual Report for 2011-12 should convincingly debunk the myth that the slowdown of 2011-12 was due to an excessively tight monetary policy.

The RBI should use its best judgement to continue to formulate its monetary policy and not take heed of unconstructive criticism. The RBI must recall the old adage; “Dogs may bark but the caravan moves on”.
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/s-s-tarapore/article3581460.ece
 

deneb

Well-Known Member
Govt and banks — a con game at some level
Dr Y.V. Reddy makes a public appearance whenever he is delivering a lecture or writing/releasing a book. When he was in Mumbai earlier this week, to release a compilation of I.G. Patel’s essays, it was a good opportunity to get his views on some current issues.

Retirement from the Reserve Bank of India has not dimmed his memory, his quick thinking or his gift of picking the right phrase to articulate his thoughts. He continues a busy career as a globe-trotting advisor even as he holds an emeritus professor’s chair at the University of Hyderabad.

Most recently he flagged a number of important issues in his landmark lecture a month ago (Per Jacobsson Foundation Lecture at Basel). He makes reference to some of those issues in this interview. Excerpts:

How did you come to be associated with this project (editing I.G. Patel’s essays)?

After retirement I was looking back. Most of us (policymakers and professional economists) are so much concerned with immediate issues and challenges that we tend to think incrementally. If there is a problem, our concern is how to respond to it. But we have rich experience of people who have faced similar problems in the past. I found I.G Patel’s public works themselves offer interesting insights — both when he was in policy and later in academia. Fortunately, his family made available his unpublished works.

When I ran through his unpublished works, it was fascinating. (He was not very forthcoming when you talked to him, being a reticent person.) I thought it would be useful for policymakers and academia as well as the media to look back and see how they did in their time.

After the global crisis, everybody in the West is looking back at the depression-era policies and the financial repression that followed and the link between finance and development. They are revisiting those issues.

But in India, we seem to think that what we should do is what we thought of yesterday. We should carry the reform forward. We should also look back.

What did you find interesting in his writings?

There is one section which has talks he gave on economic reforms and policies in 1991, 1998 and 2003. In 2003, he talked about “unease with economic reform”. That was quite an important issue that he raised. These three chapters in particular are relevant to the country. He wrote on gold and the issue of equity. His writings on the external sector may be outdated in some places. But we should understand what we went through. His analytical framework for gold was excellent.

Generally there has been criticism that academicians are technique-oriented whereas policymakers cautiously talk of policy of the day. I.G. Patel was active in academia for two decades after he left public policy. Rarely do you get someone who will talk and draw upon their experience, but not trying to impress anybody.

Are you following that model? You are also into academics now …

(Laughs) In some sense, I am enjoying looking back. The book is a product of that, yes. Now that you say it, yes, it is a good direction. But of course, I.G’s stature was so high — he went to IIM and LSE after his stint in RBI.

I.G. Patel played a crucial role in the nationalisation of banks. Today we seem to be going back on that in some sense. The Government doesn’t have enough money to capitalise banks for future requirements …

I’ll answer that in two parts. Not having enough capital is not much of an argument. If you have to provide it for a worthy cause, the Government will do it. Ultimately, the banks’ existence is because of an indirect sovereign guarantee — everywhere in the world. Banking and government — in some sense, it is the biggest con game going on (laughs)! The Government licenses banks to accept non-collateralised deposits — virtually telling people that your deposits are safe. The banks in turn agree to lend to Government whenever Government wants. This is a compact. The finance industry is represented by banks.

The issue of whether there should be public or private ownership is a second level of detail. If you don’t want to provide capital, you can provide deposit guarantees which are almost as good. So in my view capital is not an important issue.

If you look at the issue of public ownership, in those days, public ownership was considered good because it was considered an instrument of public policy. But once public policy is itself considered highly politicised, then the question comes about how public ownership is used. Institutional dynamics have shown that public ownership may tend to be more political than objectively economic. That has been the experience.

Therefore some countries, in the developed and developing world, have gone totally into the private sector. In the Indian context, the decision was taken in broader public interest to go for public ownership. Of course, after that, we now have a mix of both public and private banks. Now, the Government as the dominant owner is running the public sector banks. How they are running it is the issue.

If it is concluded that the political economy is such that you can never trust the government to manage banks in public interest then you go to private sector. But if you go to private sector, then you should have adequate regulatory mechanisms. So there are two issues here.

Public sector ownership in India was not as efficient as expected. Private sector banking in West has resulted in a crisis. Now, if India expands private sector, please do so, knowing, that if you do not have the proper regulatory framework, then it will be more expensive than having an inefficient public sector. Incidentally, I feel a mix will be useful — because if the private sector misbehaves, the public sector can expand. The information available from public sector is probably more authentic. I articulated this in a lecture last month in Basel.

Should we have more private banks?

Yes, we can have a little more of private banks. But what sort of private banks? Western experience shows that if you have conglomerates, then they become either too big to fail or too difficult to regulate. Now in India, we have a situation where in the financial sector, large industrial groups have strong presence in mutual funds, NBFC as well as insurance. Now if you add banking also to this, regulation becomes a challenge.

I would say that we need a combination of public ownership, private ownership, competition between the two, good regulation and good governance. We need to take an integrated view.

What are the lessons from the book that are relevant to policymakers today?

There are so many tools of macro-economic management that we have discarded because it was found unsuitable. Now I find it is good to revisit it. Was there something wrong with the tools or with the way we used them? Could we take the tools and use them differently now? One example is selective credit control.

Secondly, I.G. eschewed ideological extremes. Even in 1991, he said the private sector is good and it can deliver, but don’t undermine public sector.

Thirdly, while talking about institutional context, repeatedly, he says that given the political context in India, there should be a sea change if the fisc has to be brought under control. He virtually says the fiscal situation will continue to be worrisome.

Fourthly, and most importantly, he says that reforms should not be considered a laundry list — you do this and this and reform is over. Reform is a continuous rebalancing of various factors and priorities.

Here he makes a distinction between micro- and macro-economic policies. His thesis is that reforms should concentrate on micro-economy. Macro-economic policies cannot increase coal production, energy production or water usage. He lays emphasis on improving productivity sector-wise and competitive efficiency at the micro-level. That is the most important lesson to learn now.

Do we have to live with supply shortages for some time?

What you are asking is whether anything can be done, pending the lag in improving supply elasticities. That is the real bottleneck. Trying to do anything else is only an impression of doing things and will not make a material difference.

In my view, it is far better to accept that at the current stage of real economy, structural rigidities and infrastructural bottlenecks, if growth is to be moderated to 7.5 per cent for the next two to three years, so be it. This is better, rather than induce imbalance and struggle. And even 7.5 per cent rate of growth is respectable.

Therefore, we should be prepared for a rate of growth that is consistent with current supply rigidities and contemplate how to overcome it and accelerate growth. Even the assurance that we are doing this will improve sentiments.

Resetting expectations can itself revive ‘animal spirits’. It will be more credible. Uncertainty is the biggest problem for enterprises and sentiment.
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article3662339.ece?homepage=true
 

deneb

Well-Known Member
The lengths people go to avoid paying tax

It's been a taxing few days. Advisers who promote "aggressive tax avoidance" have been berated by the British government. Meanwhile a new report claims there could be $21tn (13.5tn) stored away worldwide in offshore accounts.

The mind can't comprehend the amount. If it was denominated in $1 bills, it would fill nearly 10,000 Olympic-sized swimming pools. Provided the pools were empty and that it was possible to provide enough security personnel to guard all of the pools. (It would probably be better to use the Army and police rather than a private security firm.)

Put another way, 21 trillion seconds ago, the world was 600,000 years younger and experiencing the Lower Palaeolithic period. This was the time of Homo Heidelbergensis, one of mankind's early ancestors.

Archaeologists say Heidelbergensis was in some ways quite advanced, with rudimentary language and, maybe, a habit of burying the dead.

But they were also extremely primitive. There is a lot of evidence to suggest he had not yet discovered the ability to measure large quantities of anything in terms of how many Olympic-sized swimming pools would be filled - a skill we would regard as essential now.

Overwrought quantification metaphors aside, $21tn is a lot of money to stash.

How would you even go about hiding it? With the entire output of the world's economy only being about $60tn (39tn) or so, surely like an elephant hiding behind a curtain, you would notice the bulge somewhere?

Except now the elephant isn't even in the room, or in a room on an island somewhere. According to the Tax Justice Network report - offshore "refers not so much to the actual physical location of private assets or liabilities, but to nominal, hyper-portable, multi-jurisdictional often quite temporary locations of networks of legal and quasi‐legal entities and arrangements".

So it sounds like some tax advisers have found the entrance to The Matrix.

Wherever it is, it's not in the real world experiencing real things, like tax. The report estimates that if tax was paid on the investment returns, it would yield more than the twice the amount OECD countries are spending at the moment on overseas development aid.

That's probably not how the money would have been spent in the first place. According to the report, a wide range of people might be availing themselves of these schemes: 30-year-old Chinese real-estate speculators, Silicon Valley software tycoons, Dubai oil sheiks, Russian presidents, mineral‐rich African dictators and Mexican druglords.

It conjures up the image of a group of baddies gathered in uneasy truce around a table in a secret location with only one item the agenda: How Do We Stop Superman? Just as they are about to agree a strategy, Superman himself appears and causes chaos for the participants with a selection of his superpowers.

Superman can use lasery eyes to melt all the guns he wants, but he can do nothing about a basic human urge best encapsulated by "plebianbob" one of the commenters on the 21tn story when it was first published earlier this week: "If you were very rich would you willingly pay tax?"

The very rich don't want to pay tax for three reasons:

First, money is lovely and having lots of it is better than not having lots of it.

Second, some very wealthy people collect money and giving it away ruins the aesthetic of the pile they have. It's an inclination common to all collectors.

For example, over time I have accumulated a few hundred books. Although they are of varying quality and there are many I will never read again (or read at all), the prospect of giving any of them away makes me very protective. There'll be a hole in the shelf where it was. I would miss any of them - even the Twilight series.

It's unlikely the Mexican druglords, Chinese property developers and mineral-rich African dictators sit in a library of money, rearranging the bills by alphabetical order and genre, but the impulse to hoard is the same.

Finally, it's about trust. Wealth gives people confidence. Confidence makes them sure of their opinions, and one of their opinions is that they are much better at spending their money than the government is. Allied to this is the fact that for many wealthy people, the tax is not deducted at source. They have to volunteer it.

When your tax is deducted from your wage bill, while you are aware the money was taken and would love to have it back, it was never in your hot little hand. The best you can do is to imagine the good work that money will do to support essential public services - to buy medicine in a hospital or pay the wages of a librarian who suggests a wonderful book to a child who goes on to become a Nobel Laureate poet.

When you're self-employed, it's a different story. You don't have to file until the end of the year, during which time you've become very attached to your money and you would like to see it well-treated.

This attachment convinces you that if you give it to the government, it's going to meet a sticky end. You picture your poor forlorn little notes being grasped in the meaty hand of a politician as they spend it on new curtains for the ministerial office.

By the time it comes to filing day, you are in a spitting rage. Which leads to aggressive tax avoidance.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-18983010
 

Sunny1

Well-Known Member
believing news paper is stupid thing to do....

may be rbi is right...

but people fail to understand...even if Monterrey policy are tightens this does not stops people from borrowing outside....( FII , FDI ....world bank ...and all nonsense banks in the world)

SO net result result remain same...oh...not same but negative...because it stops Indian businesses from prospering and give advantage to all foreign peoples and businesses ..

all projects are being funded with foreign money ...govt or private or public private partnership ...creating debt trap... (how Iceland and other European countries trapped)

Net Result: Indians Business go down and FII...FDi ...go up and up
 

deneb

Well-Known Member
Growth nor inflation should drive interest rate policy. The correct rate is one that promotes savings

My own position is that in using interest rates to fight inflation or promote growth, you are forgetting savers. In the ultimate analysis, investment comes from domestic savings plus foreign savings.

In the history of India and in inevitably for the future of India, more than 90% of the investment has to come from domestic savings and therefore your interest rate should be so set that it ensures a reasonably high level of savings that will finance a high level of investment and there should be incentives for efficiency and enhancement.

Ultimately, growth depends on savings, investment and productivity. I believe today's problem is that the savings are going down. If you don't tackle that then your trade-off will be at a lower level of growth.
Full YV Reddy interview

http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/reform-is-not-laundry-list-focusmicros-must-yv-reddy_731208.html
 

deneb

Well-Known Member
Public brought up short by 24-hour news

Mr Tim Sebastian, celebrity journalist, has given many guests a hard time on his ‘Hard Talk’ series of interviews on the BBC. His direct, intense and unsparing questioning has often offered riveting fare for an audience not used to seeing their politicians being grilled and taken apart.

Mr Sebastian is quick to rebut a suggestion that his style was aggressive, preferring instead to term it as ‘robust and firm’. That may be a quintessential British understatement. But as he explained to me, he saw his role as that of a prosecutor in the court of public opinion.

In a wide-ranging interview, he explained his philosophy, the trends that he observes in the media, the menace of 24-hour news cycle and the need to challenge views. It was a master class in journalism given by one of its premier practitioners. He is in India to anchor a new debating show. Excerpts:

Does the fact that you are a well-known journalist make it easier to get our politicians on board your show?

I don’t know. In other countries it often works the other way. You are known by the people who are on your show and those who are not. You are known by your friends and by your enemies.

Have you had important people say no to coming on your show?

I have had a British PM (Tony Blair) say ‘no’ for seven years. When I later asked one of his press people after he stepped down why, he said there was nothing in it for him. So there we are. One of the reasons we lost guests was because we never made deals. We still don’t.

If people come on the show, we reserve the right to ask about anything. We won’t cut out anything afterward. If people later wish they hadn’t said something, sorry, it’s too late. Nobody is forcing you to come on the show. But those are our conditions. So we have lost a lot of our guests over the years.

But that’s fine because the audience knows that if people do come — that it is fair, it is open, above board, no deals done under the counter. What you see is what you get.

How do your other interlocutors from India compare with politicians outside?

Well, Indian interlocutors aren’t any different from anybody else. Most people react the same way in a studio. You can’t separate them by nationality.

Politicians do what they do — which is to spin effectively. They are very highly media-trained — before they even step into the studio. They even have their three talk points that they should say, no matter what the questions are.

There was a lot of criticism about your aggressive style of questioning…

I don’t think that I was aggressive. I was robust. But you know, when you sit down with an interviewee, you and he are there for different reasons. There is going to be a tussle and it is going to be an adversarial relationship.

He is going to put his spin, and make himself appear as good as possible.

I am there to look at things that have gone wrong. I am the case for the prosecution, if you look at this as the court of public opinion. That is my job. It is not my job to offer him a platform to say whatever he likes without interruption and let him monopolise the whole event.

My questioning may have been firm and robust. And if I crossed the line, I was quite happy to apologise to people and did so — on several occasions.

Another criticism levelled against you is that you interrupted very often and didn’t give enough time to your guests?

You are dealing with people who are well prepared. That’s why you have to interrupt them. Otherwise you will never get to your questions. They’ll be too busy on their answers.

Well, if I didn’t interrupt, they would have taken the whole time allotted. Obviously, I am going to be criticised. You put your head on the block and you have to expect the public to chop it off.

But enough people seem to have been watching the programme over so many years (laughs). I haven’t been so far fired from any of the programmes I have been involved in. Yes, we do get criticised. Why shouldn’t the media be criticised? A little humility among journalists is a good thing. After all, we are talking to the people who do the difficult things in life — those who run countries, armies, employ tens of thousands of people, are responsible for putting food on the plates of the employees. And what do we do? We sit on the fence and we criticise everybody. We do easy things in life. I am conscious of that when I sit across people.

There are two things that are most important in journalism. One is accuracy. The other is fairness. And they are not necessarily the same thing. You can be accurate — but you can be unfair — in the question that you put to them in particular circumstances or in the particular time. And you have got to have both of those things in your mind when you interview people. The public knows pretty well what is fair.

The line between news and entertainment is diminishing. Figuratively, Page 3 is on Page 1. Isn’t this a disturbing trend?

There is trivialisation. But I’ll put it differently. The big issue is 24-hour news — because you have a big black hole to fill every day, stretching to a future without end. Any old nonsense gets on the air these days. We had to fight for space when we were doing news bulletins in the BBC, (at 1 p.m., 6 p.m. and 9 p.m.). We had to have good news judgment. Not anymore. Now it is ‘Duck crosses the road” and the camera is there. That’s ‘breaking news’. 24-hour news has destroyed our judgment which was good. Also, we do ‘coverage’ but not news. We cover events. The PM goes to town. We cover it. Was there anything new? No. Was it interesting? No. But we covered it. News is supposed to be about people. If it is not about people, it is not a story.

I saw this so keenly in the Middle East where ordinary people are not written about — they have been air-brushed out of the picture. So, society neither knows nor cares about what different sections of society do.

In the game of coverage, nobody benefits. Yes, the black hole is filled on TV. That’s all. A few advertisers may be happy. But the public? They are brought up short by 24-hour news.

Is there a way to go back? Do we have to live with this?

Yes. We can go back. There is a backlash again. The public are not stupid. They are not getting what they want. Journalism is being kept alive by the best blogs, by online newspapers and wonderful journalists doing wonderful work. It will come back.

It has to be quality over quantity. Quantity doesn’t serve them. A lot of newspapers have adapted and they are going the extra mile.
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article3687190.ece
 

del_66

Well-Known Member
Extracts from Reminiscences of a Stock Operator by Edwin Lefevre

I did precisely the wrong thing. The cotton showed me a loss and I kept it. The wheat showed me a profit and I sold it out. Of all the speculative blunders there are few greater than trying to average a losing game. Always sell what shows you a loss and keep what shows you a profit.

If all I have is ten dollars and I risk it, I am much braver than when I risk a million if I have another million salted away.

Ive got friends, of course, but my business has always been the same a one-man affair. That is why I have always played a lone hand.

What beat me was not having brains enough to stick to my own game that is, to play the market only when I was satisfied that precedents favoured my play. There is the plain fool, who does the wrong thing at all times everywhere, but there is also the Wall Street fool, who thinks he must trade all the time. No man can have adequate reasons for buying or selling stocks daily or sufficient knowledge to make his play an intelligent play.

It happened just as I figured. The traders hammered the stocks in which they figured would uncover the most stops, and sure enough, prices slid off.

For one thing, the automatic closing out of your trade when the margin reached the exhaustion point was the best kind of stop-loss order.

The game taught me the game. And it didnt spare me rod while teaching.

If somebody had told me my method would not work I nevertheless would have tried it out to make sure for myself, for when I am wrong only one thing convinces me of it, and that is, to lose money. And I am only right when I make money. That is speculating.

I knew of course, there must be a limit to the advances and an end to the crazy buying of A.O.T.-Any Old Thing-and I got bearish. But every time I sold I lost money, and if it hadnt been that I ran darn quick I would have lost a lot more.

Early that fall I not only was cleaned out again but I was so sick of the game I could no longer beat that I decided to leave New York and try something else some other place. I had been trading since my fourteenth year. I had made my first thousand dollars when I was a kid at fifteen, and my first ten thousand before I was twenty one. I had made and lost a ten thousand stake more than once. In New York I had made thousands and lost them. I got up to fifty thousand and two days later that went. I had no other business and knew no other game. After several years I was back where I began. No-worse, for I had acquired habits and a style of living that required money; though that part didnt bother me as much as being wrong so consistently.

There were times when my plans went wrong and my stocks did not run true to form, but did the opposite of what they should have done if they had kept up their regard for precedent. But they did not hit me very hard they couldnt, with my shoestring margins. My relations with my brokers were friendly enough. Their accounts and records did not always agree with mine, and the differences uniformly happened to be against me. Curious coincidence-not! But I fought for my own and usually won in the end. They always had the hope of getting from me what I had taken from them. They regarded my winnings as temporary loans, I think.

Dont misunderstand me. I never allowed pleasure to interfere with business. When I lost it was always because I was wrong and not because I was suffering from dissipation or excesses. There were never any shattered nerves or rum-shaken limbs to spoil my game. I couldnt afford anything that kept me from feeling physically and mentally fit. Even now I am usually in bed by ten. As a young man I never kept late hours, because I could not do business properly on insufficient sleep.

For instance, I had been bullish from the very start of a bull market, and I had backed my opinion by buying stocks. An advance followed, as I had clearly foreseen. So far, all very well. But what else did I do? Why, I listened to the elder statesmen and curbed my youthful impetuousness. I made up my mind to be wise carefully, conservatively. Everybody knew that the way to do that was to take profits and buy back your stocks on reactions. And that is precisely what I did, or rather what I tried to do; for I often took profits and waited for a reaction that never came. And I saw my stock go kitting up ten points more and I sitting there with my four-point profit safe in my conservative pocket. They say you never go broke taking profits. No, you dont. But neither do you grow rich taking a four-point profit in a bull market.

I think it was a long step forward in my trading education when I realised at last that when old Mr Partridge kept on telling other customers, Well, you know this is a bull market! he really meant to tell them that the big money was not in the individual fluctuations but in the main movements-that is, not in reading the tape but in sizing up the entire market and its trend.

The market does not beat them. They beat themselves, because though they have brains they cannot sit tight. Old Turkey was dead right in doing and saying what he did. He had not only the courage of his convictions but also the intelligence and patience to sit tight.

Disregarding the big swing and trying to jump in and out was fatal to me. Nobody can catch all the fluctuations. In a bull market the game is to buy and hold until you believe the bull market is near its end.

Remember that stocks are never too high for you to begin buying or too low to begin selling.

Suppose he buys his first hundred, and that promptly shows him a loss. Why should he go to work and get more stock? He ought to see at once that he is in the wrong; at least temporarily.

The Union Pacific incident in Saratoga in the summer of 1906 made me more independent than ever of tips and talk that is, of the opinions, surmises and suspicions of other people, however friendly or however able they might be personally. Events, not vanity, proved for me that I could read the tape more accurately than most of the people about me. I also was better equipped than the average customer of Harding Brothers in that I was utterly free from speculative prejudices. The bear side doesnt appeal any more than the bull side, or vice versa. My one steadfast prejudice is against being wrong.

When I am long of stocks it is because my reading of conditions has made me bullish. But you find many people, reputed to be intelligent, who are bullish because they have stocks. I do not allow my possessions or my prepossessions either to do any thinking for me. That is why I repeat that I never argue with the tape.

Obviously the thing to do was to be bullish in a bull market and bearish in a bear market.

I came to learn that even when one is properly bearish at the very beginning of a bear market it is not well to begin selling in bulk until there is no danger of the engine back-firing.

Of course, if a man is both wise and lucky, he will not make the same mistake twice. But he will make any one of ten thousand brothers or cousins of the original. The Mistake family is so large that there is always one of them around when you want to see what you can do in the fool-play line.

Losing money is the least of my troubles. A loss never troubles me after I take it. I forget it overnight. But being wrong not taking the loss that is what does the damage to the pocket book and to the soul.

I cant sleep answered the nervous one.
Why not? asked the friend.
I am carrying so much cotton that I cant sleep thinking about. It is wearing me out. What can I do?
Sell down to the sleeping point, answered the friend.

He will risk half his fortune in the stock market with less reflection that he devotes to the selection of a medium-priced automobile.

It sounds very easy to say that all you have to do is to watch the tape, establish your resistance points and be ready to trade along the line of least resistance as soon as you have determined it. But in actual practice a man has to guard against many things, and most of all against himself that is, against human nature.

A speculator must concern himself with making money out of the market and not with insisting that the tape must agree with him. Never argue with it or ask for reasons or explanations.

He should accumulate his line on the way up. Let him buy one-fifth of his full line. If that does not show him a profit he must not increase his holdings because he has obviously begun wrong; he is wrong temporarily and there is no profit in being wrong at any time.

Fear keeps you from making as much money as you ought to.

That was the only one case. There isnt a man on Wall Street who has not lost money trying to make the market pay for an automobile or a bracelet or a motor boat or a painting.

More than once in the past I had run up a shoe-string in to hundreds of thousands. Sooner or later the market would offer me an opportunity.

The game does not change and neither does human nature.

After I paid off my debts in full I put a pretty fair amount in to annuities. I made up my mind I wasnt going to be strapped and uncomfortable and minus a stake ever again.

Among the hazards of speculation the happening of the unexpected I might even say of the unexpectable ranks high.

I started my buying operations in the winter of 1917. I took quite a lot of coffee. The market however, did nothing to speak of. It continued inactive and as for the price, it did not go up as I had expected. The outcome of it all was that I simply carried my line to no purpose for nine long months.

I trade on my own information and follow my own methods.

He was utterly fearless but never reckless. He could, and did, turn on a twinkling if he found he was wrong.

At the same time I realise that the best of all tipsters, the most persuasive of all salesmen, is the tape.

The speculators deadly enemies are: Ignorance, greed, fear and hope. All the statue books in the world and all the rule books on all the Exchanges of the earth cannot eliminate these from the human animal.

On Pat Hearne He made money in stocks, and that made people ask him for advice. He would never give any. If they asked him point-blank for his opinion about the wisdom of their commitments he used a favourite race-track maxim of his: You cant tell till you bet. He traded in our office. He would buy one hundred shares of some active stock and when, or if, it went up 1 percent, he would buy another hundred. On another points advance, another hundred shares; and so on. He used to say that he wasnt playing the game to make money for others and therefore would put in a stop-loss order one point below the price of his last purchase. When the price kept going up he simply moved up his stop with it. On a 1 percent reaction he was stopped out. He declared he did not see any sense in losing more than one point, whether it came out of his original margin or out of his paper profits.
You know, a professional gambler is not looking for long shots, but for sure money. Of course, long shots are fine when they come in. In the stock market Pat wasnt after tips or playing to catch twenty-points-a-week advances, but sure money in sufficient quantity to provide him with a good sense of living. Of all the thousands of outsiders I have run across in Wall Street, Pat Hearne was the only one who saw in stock speculation merely a game of chance like faro or roulette, but nevertheless had the sense to stick to a relatively sound betting method.
After Pat Hearnes death one of our customers who had always traded with Pat and used his system made over a hundred thousand dollars in Luckawana. Then he switched over to some other stock and because he had made a big stake he thought he need not stick to Pats way. When a reaction came, instead of cutting his losses he let them run as though they were profits. Of course every cent went. When he finally quit he owed us several thousand dollars.

And he was right. I sometimes think that speculation must be an unnatural sort of business, because I find that the average speculator has arrayed against his own nature. The weaknesses that all men are prone to are fatal to success in speculation usually those very weaknesses that make him likable to his fellows or that he himself particularly guards against in those other ventures of his where they are not nearly so dangerous as when he is trading in commodities or stocks.

The public ought always to keep in mind the elementals of stock trading. When a stock is going up no elaborate explanation is needed as to why it is going up. It takes continuous buying to make a stock keep going up. As long as it does so, with only small and natural reactions from time to time, it is a pretty safe proposition to trail with it.

But if after a long steady rise a stock turns and gradually begins to go down, with only occasionally small rallies, it is obvious that the line of least resistance has changed from upward to downward. Such being the case why should anyone ask for explanations? There are probably very good reasons why it should go down
 

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